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Feeling at Home: Law, Cognitive Science, and Narrative
Lea B. Vaughn*
"Art is a lie which makes us realize truth."
-Pablo Picasso (1881-1973)
ABSTRACT
What is the "how and why" of law's affinity for narrative? In order to
explain why the use of stories is such an effective teaching and
presentation strategy in the law, this paper will consider theories and
accounts from cognitive as well as evolutionary psychology,
neuroscience, and, briefly, cultural anthropology. This account seeks to
address "how" narrative helps us learn and use the law as well as
"why" we are so compelled to use stories in teaching and in practice.
Brain science, simplified here, suggests that the first task is to grab
someone's attention. Emotionally charged events are more likely to
capture our attention and to be remembered. Because of their emotional
content, stories and narrative (which will be used interchangeably here)
seize the attention of listeners and readers, students and jurors. In turn,
this emotional fixation focuses attention on context and meaning. Studies
suggest that this context is the platform that allows later and successive
integration of details. Thus, stories work because they focus attention
and provide a context for learning the details, that is, the law. Moreover,
the same principles that apply to the success of using stories in the
classroom also bear fruit in practice. Our culture, and perhaps our
genetic make-up, compels us to use stories as a way to both comprehend
and transmit the law.
* © Lea Vaughn 2011. Please do not cite or quote without permission from the author. Professor of
Law, University of Washington. A.B., 1975, Princeton University; J.D., 1978, University of Michigan.
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Upon a Legal Story) at the Legal Writing Institute Conference on Applied Legal Storytelling (July 22-24,
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is a summer evening. The air is warm and soft. Everyone has been well
fed, and the children already lie, tangled with dogs, in sleep. A fire is not
necessary on this summer's night, but its absence draws us closer together. In a
circle, we all sit cross-legged, comfortable with a lifetime's knowledge of the
people around us. Although we are nomadic, we feel at home. And then the story
begins...
Somewhere in unrecorded, preliterate time, the naked ape became the
primate that tells stories.' No one knows when this event occurred, and we are
still trying to uncover exactly why we tell stories.2 The invention of the printing
press and the rise of electronic media have not slaked our thirst for storytelling;
1. Storytelling appears to be "the oldest of arts." DENIS DUTTON, THE ART INSTINCT: BEAUTY,
PLEASURE, & HUMAN EVOLUTION 5 (2009). "Evidence for the origins of human art necessarily remains
extremely patchy." BRIAN BOYD, ON THE ORIGIN OF STORIES: EVOLUTION, COGNITION, AND FICTION 7 (2009)
[hereinafter BOYD, ON THE ORIGIN OF STORIES]. But while "[wiriting is much younger than cave" art, "fictional
storytelling is far older, and a human universal." Id. at 9. Dutton and Boyd are the leading proponents of
applying the insights of evolutionary psychology to the arts, and specifically to literature, to argue that our love
of the arts and of fiction is an adaptation secured by natural selection. See generally id.; DUTTON, supra. Boyd
has amplified and extended his thesis in his latest work, WHY LYRICS LAST: EVOLUTION, COGNITION, AND
SHAKESPEARE'S SONNETS (2012).
2. See generally BOYD, ON THE ORIGIN OF STORIES, supra note 1.
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rather, new media have increased it. We read, we gossip,3 we blog, but whatever
the form, we are constantly telling stories.
Law schools, on the other hand, have only lately, and often reluctantly,
acknowledged stories.4 Wedded to the Socratic Method of Christopher Columbus
Langdell and leery of appearing subjective, the law-school classroom has
traditionally been a place of hard analysis and probing questions.5 But for a first-
year student, and even many upper-level students, it is an uncomfortable place.
The chasm between prior educational experiences, including undergraduate
studies, and law school generally does not prepare a law student to feel "at
home" in the law-school classroom. Partially to bridge that gap, many of us,
often without knowing why, have begun to use stories in our law-school
classrooms.6 This venture is often successful, and allows many law students to
make connections between their lives before law school and their unfolding lives
as lawyers. Students frequently comment that the stories help them to learn the
related doctrine more easily and deeply. Indeed, exposure to storytelling prepares
students for significant aspects of practice as well as making conceptually
difficult legal ideas more intelligible.7
3. Gossip, in fact, is an important social and possibly adaptive behavior. Through gossip we access the
trustworthiness of our conspecifics. "[T]he search for trustworthiness makes us avid consumers of gossip."
STEVEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS 405 (1997). For an extended discussion of the intersection of gossip,
character, and evolutionary psychology, see BLAKEY VERMEULE, WHY Do WE CARE ABOUT LITERARY
CHARACTERS? (2010) (Literature deepens the ability to humans to read the intentions of others, a trait vital to
survival and part of our cognitive make-up.).
4. See, e.g., Bret Rappaport, Tapping the Human Adaptive Origins of Storytelling by Requiring Legal
Writing Students to Read a Novel in Order to Appreciate how Character, Setting, Plot, Theme, and Tone
(CSPTT) Are as Important as IRAC, 25 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 267 (2008). Rappaport argues that Langdell's
characterization of law as a science focuses on the use of IRAC to teach "students to think[] like a lawyer." Id.
at 270 (alteration in original). He notes that this approach "can suck the life right out of [legal] conflicts" that
are the study of law. Id. at 270-72 (alteration in original) (quoting Kenneth D. Chestek, The Plot Thickens: The
Appellate Brief as Story, 14 LEGAL WRITING 127, 130 (2008)); see also Kim Lane Scheppele, Narrative
Resistance and the Struggle for Stories, 20 LEGAL STUD. F. 83 (1996) (addressing both civil law's averseness to
facts and stories as well as mainstream critiques of feminist and critical-race theory scholarship that employ
stories to advance their arguments).
5. Rappaport, supra note 4, at 270.
6. Although I will define "stories" below, see infra Part II, it is not clear to me whether it matters that
these stories are true; that is, whether they are journalistic accounts or fictional. One recent set of curricular
materials, the Legal Stories Series (Foundation Press), see, e.g., infra note 22, is based on the stories behind the
cases. Fernand N. Dutile, Bringing Cases to Life: Education Law Stories, 35 J.C. & U.L. 131, 131-33 (2008). It
is designed to supplement instruction "through the use of appellate-court opinions." Id. at 131. The idea behind
the series is to prevent students from seeing "cases so clinically that the people involved become nothing more
than faceless, bloodless robots who merely provide the setting for our legal magic, manipulation, or mistakes."
Id. Many of these accounts, he avers, "read[] like a good novel." Id. at 139.
7. Many would characterize lawyers as storytellers, and deem storytelling a skill central to practice. The
literature abounds with articles analyzing various aspects of this insight. For example, Professor
Menkel-Meadow argues in one of her articles that lawyers transform a client's narrative into legal documents
such as a complaint. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Transformation of Disputes by Lawyers: What the Dispute
Paradigm Does and Does Not Tell Us, 1985 Mo. J. DIsp. RESOL. 25, 31-32 (1985). Similarly, Professors Fajans
and Falk argue that narrative techniques need to be brought back into pleading practice. Elizabeth Fajans &
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In conversations with colleagues,8 we began to explore the ways in which we
had begun using stories in our classrooms. Faculty used stories to help students
make deeper and faster connections to the legal materials covered. In my own
classes, I have frequently used stories and extended-narrative hypotheticals to
enrich the class and focus learning. My metaphor for teaching the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure is that they are a set of rules for transforming the client's
narrative, or story, into a stylized narrative that is initially presented in the
complaint.9 Ultimately, the competing stories that jurors and judges are told are
mediated through the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure at trial. This reality of the transformation of stories links the classroom
to practice-novice students must learn how and why expert practitioners use
narrative to advance client goals.
At the same time, my interest in the scientific literature in psychology and
biology has deepened over the last decade. Advances in science and learning
theory have far outstripped anything I learned as an undergraduate in the 1970s.
My traditional scholarly research had focused on the problems of sexual
harassment and domestic violence in the workplace.' ° More recently, I have
focused on the abusive workplace.1" Even in the driest of court opinions, these
workplace problems manifest powerful narratives of inequality, violence, and
personal, as well as structural, affronts to human dignity. As I delved into the
research on abusive workplaces, I was increasingly drawn to the literature in
psychology and neuroscience to understand and explain the effects of these
phenomena on workers. Serendipitously, much of this new research also has a
Mary R. Falk, Untold Stories: Restoring Narrative to Pleading Practice (Sept. 2008) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://works.bepress.com/elizabethjfajans/20 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
8. My conversations started with Professor Katherine O'Neill, University of Washington School of Law
(B.A. Stanford University, 1975; J.D., Columbia University, 1980). Professor O'Neill's companion paper to this
one, presented at the same conference, is A Story with No End in Sight (June 30, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). She states: "My tentative thesis is that quality journalism
can provide context and contemporary relevance for law students as they learn to 'think like lawyers."' Id. at 8.
In this, she wanted "to mitigate the abstraction of law school and to situate the study of law within the context
of social events and the activities of major economic and political institutions." Id. at 9-10. To do so, she
treated the journalistic accounts used in her class as a form of "storytelling" because journalists use narrative
techniques characteristic of storytelling. See generally id. The two journalistic stories upon which she relied in
her contracts class were Peter J. Boyer, Ohio Postcard: Eviction-The Day They Came for Addie Polk's House,
NEW YORKER, Nov. 24, 2008, at 48, and Jonathan Karp & Miriam Jordan, House of Cards: How the Subprime
Mess Hit Poor Immigrant Groups, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2007, at Al.
9. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 32; Fajans & Falk, supra note 7.
10. Lea B. Vaughn, The Customer Is Always Right... Not! Employer Liability for Third Party Sexual
Harassment, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2002); Lea B. Vaughn, Victimized Twice-The Intersection of
Domestic Violence and the Workplace: Legal Reform Through Curriculum Development, 47 Loy. L. REV. 231
(2001).
11. Lea B. Vaughn, In Denial: "Brain Rules," Legal Norms and the Abusive Workplace, presentation at
the University of Augsburg, Germany, for a conference titled Workplace Bullying and Protection Against
Discrimination in the Employer-Employee Relationship: Changes and Risks in an International Comparison
(Apr. 17, 2010).
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bearing on how people learn. My interest in theories about teaching and my
interest in workplace narrative happily converged as I explored how this
literature explains what captivates our attention and helps us to learn and practice
the law.
So what does the scientific literature tell us? First, while our technology has
taken us to the stars and unpacked the genome, we have not significantly
evolved. 2 Although the information we process has become overwhelmingly
complicated, the way in which our brains work and learn has changed little from
the days in which we ran across the savannah, looking for our next meal and
hoping not to become someone else's. The dilemma, then, for the law instructor
is how to initially capture the attention of students, help them to digest and
organize complex patterns of legal doctrine, and then recall and apply it with a
brain that is still cued to the dangers of the savannah rather than the law-school
classroom or courtroom. These same challenges-of capturing attention and
developing understanding of the law-confront the practitioner dealing with
clients and lay juries.
Brain science, simplified here, suggests that the first task is to grab
someone's attention because "better attention always equals better learning."'1
3
One of the features of stories that captures students' attention better than cases is
their emotional content. Emotionally charged events are more likely to capture
our attention and be remembered.' 4 A beneficial consequence of this emotional
fixation is that it focuses attention on the content, context, and meaning of a
story. This context is the platform that allows later and successive integration of
the details. Thus, stories work because they focus attention and provide a context
for learning the details, that is, the law. Moreover, the same principles that apply
to the success of this strategy in the classroom can also bear fruit in the
courtroom and in litigation documents.' 5
12. PINKER, supra note 3, at 205. Pinker surmises that we are probably not biologically evolving very
much, in part because modern human life is not conducive to evolution through natural selection. Id. The basic
structure of our brain was set in the Pleistocene: "From our day back to the time of Socrates and Plato is a mere
120 generations. If we go further back from their Athens to the invention of writing, agriculture, and the first
cities, it is a lot longer: another 380 generations. But the Pleistocene itself-the evolutionary theater in which
we acquired the tastes, . . . was eighty thousand generations long." DUTTON, supra note 1, at 23, 42-43. But see
JOHN MEDINA, BRAIN RULES: 12 PRINCIPLES FOR SURVIVING AND THRIVING AT WORK, HOME, AND SCHOOL
35-36 (2008) (discussing how people became smarter in order to survive); Oliver Sacks, A Man of Letters: A
Neurologist's Notebook, NEW YORKER, June 28, 2010, at 22 (discussing evolutionary changes through natural
selection). Others, however, would argue that the attainment of human culture has allowed us to evolve in a way
that escapes the constraints of natural selection. Stephen Jay Gould suggests this in some of his writing. BOYD,
ON THE ORIGIN OF STORIES, supra note 1, at 42 (citing Gould). Steven Pinker, who occupies a stance somewhat
closer to Gould's than other evolutionary psychologists discussed below, appears to agree: "My own view is
that human brains evolved by one set of laws, those of natural selection and genetics, and now interact with one
another according to other sets of laws, those of cognitive and social psychology, human ecology, and history."
PINKER, supra note 3, at 208. This nature-versus-nurture debate will be briefly addressed below.
13. MEDINA, supra note 12, at 7 4 .
14. id. at 71-83.
15. Id. Medina's very accessible book presents twelve rules, based on peer-reviewed science, that
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In this article, I will discuss three bodies of knowledge that seek to account
for how and why stories are such powerful devices for human learning. First,
neuroscience and cognitive psychology seek to explain the how of learning. By
explaining how attention, memory, and learning occur in the brain, scientists
have provided a useful and salient account of how stories help us to learn.
Second, a brief look at cultural anthropology suggests that it is a universal feature
of all human cultures that we learn and transmit knowledge by storytelling.
16
Finally, evolutionary psychology, 7 a relatively new field, posits that the appeal of
stories goes beyond the cultural; rather, this mechanism for learning may be
hard-wired into our brains. That is, our appreciation of the arts, particularly of
storytelling and music, may be adaptations that have continuing use for learning
given the plasticity of our brain/mind. 8
In Part II of this article, I will briefly address what constitutes a "story." This
concept is impossible to confine to one definition. The scientific sources used
here describe stories in a different way than do literary theorists. In Part III, I will
describe the three accounts that shed light on why stories help us to learn,
beginning with current neuroscience findings on learning, memory, context, and
attention. It then will move, briefly, to cultural anthropology, and end with the
answer that is provided by evolutionary psychology: we learn from stories
because we have evolved to do so. In the conclusion, I illustrate how these
insights bear on learning as well as on practicing the law.
II. WHAT IS A STORY?
Defining a "story" as anything beyond something that has "a beginning, a
middle, and an end" can only lead to trouble. 9 In addition to identifying the
explain better ways to structure learning and working experiences. Medina's scientific references are available
at his website: John Medina, BRAIN RULES (2012), www.brainrules.net (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
16. This article will not go into depth on this issue because cultural anthropology's insights are fairly
well established and widely accepted.
17. Evolutionary psychology is not accepted by all authorities, and is contrary to the Standard Social
Science Model (SSSM). See, e.g., PINKER, supra note 3, at 44-58, 165-71. As such, it constitutes a new
paradigm for understanding certain human behavior and may account for a connection between culture and
neuroscience. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
18. "Brain" and "mind" will generally be used interchangeably in this article. Evolutionary psychology
and neuroscience suggest that the two are more closely related, if not identical, than our received Cartesian
dualism usually leads us to intuit. See ANTONIO DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE
HUMAN BRAIN (1994). Emotions are necessary to cognitive thought; "Descartes' error[ was] the abyssal
separation between body and mind," and the idea that emotions and thought are separate. Id. at 249-50.
19. ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 113 (2000). Some legal
academics, however, have adopted the model that Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner developed in their
book, Minding the Law, in which they state that the component parts of stories are (1) its grounding in the
ordinary or every day, (2) some type of trouble that disrupts ordinary expectations, (3) an attempt to address the
disruption, that eventually leads to (4) a resolution. Id. at 113-14; see also Carolyn Grose, Storytelling Across
the Curriculum: From Margin to Center, from Clinic to the Classroom, 7 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS
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salient aspects of what makes an account a story rather than an analogy,
metaphor, or parable, the largest obstacle is deciding whether the most effective
part of a story comes from a fictional rather than factual aspect. Most stories have
some tie to reality. Unless one is reading the most cutting-edge science fiction,
most of the laws of physics will still apply. Similarly, stories will be marked by
forms of human organizations, such as government and community. For this
reason, I argue that while there may be some psychological advantages to using
fiction, there can still be advantages to using factual stories, whether they come
from newspapers and magazines or fuller, richer accounts-the actual
narrative-of the cases we teach. In the end, it may not make a difference. °
Interest in stories and narrative has blossomed in the last two decades within
the academy and in practice. 2' For example, many professors now assign
materials from the Legal Stories Series to augment student understanding of the
cases assigned for class.2" Some casebooks have framed their courses as an
exploration of the tension between formalism and narrative, and include excerpts
from literature or journalism in addition to cases. 23 This focus is not limited to the
teaching of doctrinal materials, but can also be used to deepen the appreciation of
a wide variety of practice materials.24 Similarly, many practice materials or
37, 42 & nn.20-25 (2010) (adopting Amsterdam and Bruner's model). She notes that this schema is typically
called "the plot." Id. at 42.
20. Ana Margarida Abrantes, Narrative-A Key Concept for Cognition and Culture (May 24, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1409402 (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review). Abrantes has a different definition of narrative, choosing to develop a functional definition that
highlights its use as a human strategy for dealing with "time, process and change." Id. at 1. (quoting DAVID
HERMAN, BASIC ELEMENTS OF NARRATIVE 2 (2009)). As such, she deems her definition as "cognitive by
nature." Id. This definition, however, is not necessarily at odds with the more typical definition outlined above.
For example, Abrantes identifies the four parts of a narrative or story as "situatedness," the "[s]tructured event
sequence," "the rupture" and "the what it's like dimension." Id. at 2-3 (citations omitted). These would be
recognized more popularly as the setting, the plot, the conflict, and what is represented or communicated to us
in a particular story.
21. See id. at 3-7 (providing examples of this scholarship); see also Linda H. Edwards, Once Upon a
Time in Law: Myth, Metaphor, and Authority, 77 TENN. L. REV. 883 (2010) ("Since at least 1983, when Robert
Cover gave us [Nomos and Narrative], and probably as early as James Boyd White's [The Legal Imagination],
we have been on notice that the law has stories."). Noting, however, that stories are more frequently used in law
and legal academia is not to say that this was an easy transition. See, e.g., Nancy Levit, Reshaping the Narrative
Debate, 34 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 751 (2010). Levit outlines the debate, particularly as it applies to family and
workplace issues. Id. at 753-54.
22. For example, I frequently assign a chapter or two from Civil Procedure Stories (2004) in my civil
procedure course. CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2004).
23. Continuing with the civil procedure example, the casebook I used most recently is Subrin, Minow,
Brodin, and Main's Civil Procedure: Doctrine, Practice, and Content, the third edition, which avers directly to
this tension in their teachers' manual. STEPHEN N. SUBRIN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE,
AND CONTENT (3d ed. 2008). Similarly, the casebook, in the introductory materials, juxtaposes United States v.
Hall and Martin Luther King's Letter from a Birmingham Jail.
24. For example, to learn client interviewing, in addition to watching a live client interview, civil
procedure students can read either of the following two articles on the connection between narrative and
practice: Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100
YALE L.J. 2107 (1991), or Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7. The latter is particularly interesting because it
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journals, particularly in litigation, will include articles on the importance of using
stories in writing briefs or addressing the jury.
III: HOW AND WHY Do STORIES HELP US LEARN?
A few words of introduction are in order before formally beginning this
section. First, the sources used to compile this section are accessible to the lay
reader.5 Second, I am not a literary theorist, psychologist, or scientist. My
training has been, on the contrary, in philosophy, education, and the law. This
does not mean, however, that my reading of these materials from outside of my
field is uncritical, but that it comes from an outside perspective rather than from
someone with formal training in these domains.
addresses the way in which lawyers decode and recode a client's story from everyday lay prose into something
that can be acted upon by courts and other legal entities. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7. James Boyd White
also believes that law and translation are related. James Boyd White, An Old-Fashioned View of the Nature of
Law, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 381 (2011). "Law was the language into which this problem would have
to be translated .... " Id. at 384. He illustrates this relationship in a discussion of a client interview where the
client "will have a story to tell and a language in which to tell it." Id. at 387. The lawyer's task will be "to go
from his or her language to the law and back again ... ." Id. at 388.
25. Lorie Graham and Stephen McJohn note the growing use of cognitive science in the law to describe
"how we reason, decide, intend, moralize, and perceive." Lorie M. Graham & Stephen M. McJohn, Cognition,
Law, Stories, 10 MINN. J. L. SC. & TECH. 255, 255 (2009) (citing STEVEN PINKER, THE STUFF OF THOUGHT
(2007)). For obvious reasons, the use of cognitive science has been especially prevalent in criminal law and in
articles about law-school pedagogy. One of the greatest services that any academic or public intellectual can
perform is to make some of their work available to as wide an audience as possible. Therefore, the information
and insights that are developed below should be readily attainable to legal readers who wish to understand more
about the connections between anthropology, psychology/neuroscience, and law. Consider, for example, the
following: "There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed into a
few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity,
from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being,
evolved." JAMES T. COSTA, THE ANNOTATED ORIGIN: A FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST EDITION OF ON THE ORIGIN
OF SPECIES 490 (2009). Stephen Jay Gould borrowed this sentiment, "This View of Life," in titling his
three-hundred gracefully written essays that appeared in Natural History "without a break from January 1974 to
January 2001 .... STEPHEN JAY GOULD, I HAVE LANDED: THE END OF A BEGINNING IN NATURAL HISTORY
15 & n.* (2002). Although Gould disagreed with evolutionary psychology's premises, his love of literature and
a deeply held belief in the role of the public intellectual writing for a curious public inform this work.
In fact, it is at our peril if we do not study these subjects because of the way they bring insights to bear on
nearly all realms of legal (and economic) study. Although I do not think those fields will one day "swamp" the
law, we could all benefit from a closer alliance between these intellectual domains. Similarly, while I cite a
number of well-known studies and books, I do not intend to provide exhaustive annotation of the various "law
and" subjects implicated here. For more coverage, however, see, for example, Owen D. Jones & Timothy H.
Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 405, 411-12 & nn.8-14 (2005). They begin by
noting that "[u]ntil about forty years ago, legal thinkers were firm in the conviction that law was an autonomous
discipline" which has broken down to become a wide variety of "law and" subjects. Id. at 411. Finally, this
account of storytelling compels consideration of the new discoveries in cognitive science; their ultimate effects
on legal theory and law cannot be ignored: "Each new generation of astronomers discovers that the universe is
much bigger than their predecessors imagined. The same is also true of brain complexity. Every era's most
advanced technologies, when applied to the study of the brain, keep uncovering more layers of nested
complexity, like a set of never ending Russian dolls." Christof Koch, Playing the Body Electric, SCIENTIFIC
AM. MIND, Mar./Apr. 2010, at 18.
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A. How Do We Learn from Stories?: Lessons from Neuroscience and Cognitive
Psychology
Of all of the developments in psychology, the advances in neuroscience and
cognitive psychology have been perhaps the most helpful to people who teach. 6
Psychology has shifted from a social science to a natural science, focusing on
how the brain works as well as psychology's traditional domains of human
behavior. This can mean study of subject matter as remote from law as the
biochemical and electrical phenomena 27 that make thought possible to studies of
brain function in more manageable units like memory or attention. But whether
one is a cognitive scientist or an evolutionary psychologist, both groups converge
on the belief that "[t]he brain appears to be designed to solve problems related to
surviving in an unstable outdoor environment, and to do so in nearly constant
motion. 28
Regarding the draw of stories in the classroom, three psychological
phenomena are pertinent: (1) emotion and attention, (2) memory, and (3) the role
of context and meaning, especially how these two latter concepts vary for
novices and experts in a particular discipline. Storytelling and narrative in law
school improve the operation of each of these learning dynamics above and
beyond the didactic recitation of cases.
1. Emotion and Attention
Emotion plays a critical role in the classroom on at least two levels. First, it
can be important for creating an environment in which people can learn.29
26. Some argue that law professors have been reluctant to make themselves aware of advances in
cognitive and educational psychology. "Despite significant advances in the science of learning, law professors
today teach much as their own professors did a generation ago. Legal scholars and lawyers know surprisingly
little about the cognitive science research that has unveiled new methods of harnessing the brain to work harder
and smarter." Deborah J. Merritt, Legal Education in the Age of Cognitive Science and Advanced Classroom
Technology, 14 B.U. J. Sct. & TECH. L. 39,41 (2008).
27. Therefore, this article will not depict at any great length the neural basis of learning or of brain
anatomy. Simply put, learning is also exhibited at the level of the neurons as they grow and branch. See, e.g.,
HENRY GLEITMAN ET AL., The Neural Basis for Learning, in PSYCHOLOGY 154-56 (6th ed. 2004). As it pertains
to this paper, however, the fact that learning occurs at the neural level throughout our lives establishes the basis
for the claim that our brains are "plastic," or capable of learning throughout our lifetime. This takes place
mainly through the process of long-term potentiation, in which a neuron can become more receptive to stimuli
and this process forms the cellular basis of learning and memory. Id.
28. MEDINA, supra note 12, at 4-5.
29. Although I will make passing reference to the effects of stress and a poor emotional environment on
learning, that is not the major point of this article. Modern research reveals that a classroom requires an
atmosphere that is conducive to learning in contrast to the cauldrons of fear that older lawyers may recall from
their law-school days. Granted, the fear may have constituted an emotionally salient stimulus that focused one's
attention, but it is not clear whether fear helped one to learn. See, e.g., id. at 45-46 (indicating that creating a
stressful learning environment may be counterproductive).
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Second, emotion is a hook that grabs our attention.30 As John Medina notes,
"[w]e don't pay attention to boring things."31 As he elaborates, "The more
attention the brain pays to a given stimulus, the more elaborately the information
will be encoded-and retained. '32 As it turns out, we are most likely to pay
attention when our emotions are engaged.
Fear, whether on the savannah or in the classroom, is certainly an emotional
hook. But in modem life, it is problematic. It is now well documented that stress
and anxiety can interfere with the learning process. In fact, excessive stress can
literally kill brain cells.33 For most people, this is a picture-perfect description of
the first year of law school. While this kind of flight-or-fight response was useful
on the savannah, the long-term stress that most of us feel in a long-term learning
situation is not helpful. During stress, the body floods itself with hormones such
as adrenaline and cortisol "spurred into action by your brain's hypothalamus. 3 4 If
the stress is moderate, this can spur learning because it does mimic our
prehistoric life, but
[i]f the stress is too severe or too prolonged, however, stress begins to
harm learning .... In almost every way it can be tested, chronic stress
hurts our ability to learn.... Specifically, stress hurts declarative
memory (things you can declare) and executive function (the type of
thinking that involves problem-solving). 5
One of the advantages of storytelling, as opposed to traditional cold-call
Socratic teaching, is that it can create an environment and an emotional context
that is more conducive to learning. Many of us, when telling stories to our
classes, change our effect and create an atmosphere of immediacy. 6 What does
30. "In short, adults learn by paying attention to what they want to learn, thinking about it, and then
using the information repeatedly." Hillary Burgess, Deepening the Discourse Using the Legal Mind's Eve:
Lessons from Neuroscience and Psychology that Optimize Law School Learning, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 23
(2011). She notes that adults, like children, have to "choose to focus on specific stimuli" so it still pays to
capture their attention. Id. at 24; see also Anthony J. Greene, Making Connections: The Essence of Memory Is
Linking One Thought to Another, SCIENTIFIC AM. MIND, Jul./Aug. 2010, at 22 (discussing how memory is
based on making connections with what one learns).
31. MEDINA, supra note 12, at 71.
32. Id. at 74.
33. Id. at 169-82. Medina provides that "not all stress is the same;" some types of stress harm learning
while other types improve it. Id. at 172-73. Stress and its associated physiological suite of reactions were
originally designed, as noted in more detail below, to "help[] us manage the threats that could keep us from
procreating." Id. at 175. The fear associated with this kind of stress was evolutionarily useful: "Life-threatening
events are some of the most important experiences we can remember." Id. at 177-78. Being called on to recite a
case, however, is not (or should not be) one of those events. Inappropriate chronic stress can lead to illness, a
weakened immune response, harm to learning and memory, depression, and interference in the brain's
executive functions. Id. at 176-80.
34. Id. at 174.
35. Id. at 178.
36. Merritt, supra note 26, at48 & n.36.
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this look like? It most likely means that we may come from behind our lectern,
relax our body language, and use a conversational style of instruction." Merritt
notes that faculty who display "immediacy" "significantly boost their students'
interest in a subject."3
A story given its relationship to emotion becomes an "emotionally competent
stimulus" or "ECS."3 9 In fact, the more attention we pay to a stimulus, the more
likely we are to encode and retain it in our memory." Additionally, our radar for
the interesting is also shaped by our past experiences and genetic make-up. Thus,
the fact that storytelling is a universal way of signaling the intent to both
entertain and transmit information tends to get our attention, particularly if the
story has salience to what is being taught or to our personal interests.
"Emotionally arousing events tend to be better remembered than neutral
events.",4' The more a story arouses emotions and interest, the more likely a
student is paying attention and prepared to absorb the more difficult legal
material that follows a story in the typical law-school classroom. The other
37. Id. at 49 & n.40.
38. Id. at n.39 (noting that more gain, however, may come from establishing long-term relationships
with students as a motivational cue); see also MEDINA, supra note 12, at 45 ("[O]ur ability to learn has deep
roots in relationships. If so, our learning performance may be deeply affected by the emotional environment in
which the learning takes place. There is surprising empirical data to support this. The quality of education may
in part depend on the relationship between student and teacher.").
39. MEDINA, supra note 12, at 80. "When the brain detects an emotionally charged event, the amygdala
releases dopamine into the system. Because dopamine greatly aids memory and information processing, you
could say the Post-It note on a given piece of information means that information is going to be more robustly
processed." Id. at 80-81; see also How PEOPLE LEARN: BRAIN, MIND, EXPERIENCE, AND SCHOOL 14-15 (John
D. Bransford et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter Bransford], available at http://www.nap.edu (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (stating that "if [the students'] initial understanding is not engaged, they may fail to
grasp the new concepts and information that are taught").
40. MEDINA, supra note 12, at 74; see also JONAH LEHRER, PROUST WAS A NEUROSCIENTIST 75-95
(2007) (providing a more lyrical, narrative account of memory in the face of an emotionally competent
stimulus). In Chapter 4: Marcel Proust: The Method of Memory, Lehrer chronicles how Proust's description of
his memories, particularly of the famous madeleine, foreshadowed later scientific discoveries about memory.
Id. at 81. Lehrer notes that Proust explores how "time mutates memory," which we now know to be the case as
"[e]very memory begins as a changed connection between two neurons." Id. at 81, 83. That is, memory is a
process that occurs, as Dr. Eric Kandel has theorized, at the nerve synapses. Id. at 85, 91; see also MEDINA,
supra note 12, at 57 ("Kandel showed that when people learn something, the wiring in their brains changes. He
demonstrated that acquiring even simple pieces of information involves the physical alteration of the structure
of the neurons participating in the process."). This constant physical change explains why each of us will,
ultimately, have different wiring in our brains and that the strength of the memory is contingent upon the
strength of the synaptical connection (which is why repetition matters). Id. at 57-62.
Scientists at the Montreal Neurological Institute and Hospital, McGill University, and University of
California, Los Angeles recently confirmed Proust's (and Kandel's) intuitions and modem scientists' theories
when they captured, for the first time, the image of a memory being made. "The finding provides the first visual
evidence that when a new memory is formed new proteins are made locally at the synapse-the connection
between nerve cells-increasing the strength of the synaptic connection and reinforcing the memory." First
Image of Memories Being Made, SCI. DAILY (June 18, 2009), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/
06/090618151331.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Their study, published in Science Daily,
explains that this architecture allows humans to retain information stably yet flexibly over time. Id.
41. MEDINA, supra note 12, at 79.
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valuable component of a story is that it gives a person meaning for the details
that follow.42 Small wonder, then, that accomplished trial lawyers tend to be
marvelous storytellers, as they instruct the jury in the facts and the law.
2. Memory
Memory, although we have only one word for it, is now understood to be a
very complicated and multipart process. But the basics of memory "depend on
three basic processes: encoding, storage, and retrieval.,, 3 Basically, this means
that "information to be remembered must be put in a form that the brain can
accept and use."" Second, we need a way to retain knowledge over time, which
is the value of stories. Finally, we need to be able to retrieve the information we
have stored into consciousness (and forget what is no longer useful or true).
Further, there are a complicated series of typology of memory. For the purposes
of this article, the focus is on semantic memory (as opposed to episodic or
procedural), the memory that allows one to assimilate generalized knowledge.
Traditional descriptions of memory, generally called the "information-
processing model," describe memory as a three-part phenomena:
CHART 1: THE INFORMATION-PROCESSING MODEL45
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42. This is particularly true for the novice learner. See, e.g., Bransford, supra note 39, at 31-50
(discussing "[H]ow [E]xperts [D]iffer from [N]ovices"). A lawyer may pay more attention to a completely legal
presentation because she will have the framework of information for which the details presented can be
integrated. This is not true of a student or novice lawyer who is still developing that framework.
43. DOUGLAS A, BERNSTEIN ET AL., PSYCHOLOGY 235 (7th ed. 2006). A complete explanation of the
process is beyond the scope of this paper.
44. Id. at 236. Encoding is further broken down into three categories: acoustic (sounds), visual (a
picture), and semantic (meaning). A story has power, therefore, because it can be encoded semantically and
through a sense. Id.
45. ld. at 24 1.
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In this model, our senses register information for a very short period of time,
and if our attention is piqued, the information might enter short-term memory.
Note how contingent memory can be-the presentation of a stimulus is not a
guarantee of retention. Moreover, although memory is typically described as a
linear process, it tends to be interactive and shaped by the experiences that
contribute to your long-term memory which, in turn, may influence whether one
perceives somethingi 6 For example, a three-year-old looking at a word may see
an array of lines and circles; a literate adult would see a word. Consider this
description of reading:
The act of reading illustrates all three stages of memory processing. As
you read. . , light energy reflected from the page reaches your eyes,
where it is converted to neural activity and registered in your sensory
memory. If you pay attention to these visual stimuli, your perception of
the patterns of light can be held in short-term memory. This stage of
memory holds the early parts of the sentence so that they can be
integrated and understood as you read the rest of the sentence. As you
read, you are constantly recognizing words by matching your perceptions
of them with the patterns and meanings you have stored in long-term
memory. In short, all three stages of memory are necessary for you to
understand a sentencer.
These three stages, then, each describe a different type of memory, and the
task facing a law-school professor is to ensure that material communicated in
class becomes part of a young lawyer's long-term memory of the law. Or in
practice, that a client can understand communicated legal opinions or that a jury
has a recall of the story to which jury instructions must be applied. The
importance of the story lies in its ability to facilitate and enlarge short-term
memory, as well as to allow a student or lay listener to more easily relate new
knowledge (legal materials) to previously assimilated knowledge.
Short-term memory is actually a component of working memory.48 Short-
term memory allows us to store "limited amounts of information for a limited
46. Memory is also shaped by culture. MEDINA, supra note 12, at 76 (describing an experiment
involving memory where, on average, urban Asians recall features of a visual scene differently than people
urban Americans); id. at 75 (discussing that native New Guinea students can detect "subtle changes in the
jungle" that urbanites cannot).
47. BERNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 43, at 242. This example seems particularly apt for hearing or reading
a story. It also indicates that memory is useful because it develops a "web of connections between people and
things.... And it is the connections that let us understand cause and effect, learn from our mistakes and
anticipate the future." Greene, supra note 30, at 22.
48. Merritt, supra note 26, at 45. "[Tlhe brain contains two types of memory: long-term memory and
working memory." Id. at 44. Long term memory is vast, perhaps infinite, and "holds all of our recollections and
accumulated knowledge . I..." d. at 44-45.
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amount of time."49 Working memory allows one to "manipulate ... information
... held in short-term memory," and is crucial "to do[ing] many kinds of mental
work.50 Most pertinent here is the capacity of short-term memory, or immediate
memory span. Unfortunately, most adults can retain only six or seven items for
recall at a time for about twenty seconds, and all information that is to make it to
long-term memory "must navigate this passage to reach the brain's long-term
storehouse."5
In a traditional law classroom, where the details and information come at one
like water from a fire hose, this limited capacity hinders learning. This limited
capacity did not matter when we were concerned with the five or six animals in
front of us, and our need to identify them (will they eat us or can we eat
them???), but when we're trying to hold facts, issues, decisions, holdings, and
reasoning in our minds, especially as novices, we do well to give up. But not to
despair. Short-term memories can be singular items like numbers or words, but
they can also be collective items or groupings, which psychologists call
"chunks. 5 2 As Bernstein notes:
Chunks of information can become very complex.... [P]eople can build
bigger and bigger chunks of information....
Learning to use bigger and bigger chunks of information can enhance
short-term memory. Children's memories improve partly because they
gradually become able to hold as many as seven chunks in memory, but
also because they get better at grouping information into
chunks... . Adults, too, can greatly increase the capacity of their short-
term memory by more appropriate chunking.... One college student
increased his immediate memory span from seven digits to eighty
digits.... In short, although the capacity of short-term memory is more
or less constant-five to nine chunks of meaningful information-the
size of those chunks can vary tremendously. 3
49. BERNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 43, at 243.
50. Id. (citations omitted).
51. Merritt, supra note 26, at 45.
52. DAVID A. SOUSA, HOW THE BRAIN LEARNS 296 (4th ed. 2011). "Chunking" is "[t]he ability of the
brain to perceive a coherent group of items as a single item or chunk." Id.; see also Graham & McJohn, supra
note 25, at 261 (describing how as we learn, we can aggregate small pieces of knowledge into one piece that
becomes a new "chunk"). "Law school, in large part, consists of assembling chunked concepts. A tort, like
battery, is composed of several elements, each of which breaks down into sub-elements. After enough practice,
students and lawyers use 'battery' . . . fluidly .i..." ld.That is, as we learn the constituent elements of each tort,
we can ultimately assimilate them into one chunk subsumed under a label like battery or assault.
53. BERNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 43, at 245 (citations omitted).
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My hypothesis is that the use of stories enables the law student to develop
bigger "chunks" of memory during the typical class.54 Legal information that is
delivered with the story is more likely to be encoded and retained into long-term
memory, which is nearly limitless in its size and indefinite in its time scale,
subject to disease and death. While some of our long-term memory encoding is
automatic, most of us must be very conscious of our attempts to move
information into a permanent location. While educational psychologists often
focus on various rehearsal and retention strategies, it may be that stories help by
providing a hook for chunking legal information in a way that it can be encoded
into long-term memory. That is, the use of stories facilitates the move from
novice to expert as students pack more content into each retrievable chunk of
information. The students may remember the story as a chunk to which they can
attach and retain various legal doctrines relevant to understanding the account as
a legal story as well. Stories are also helpful because people tend to encode the
general meaning of information rather than discrete details. For example, a story
about an assault may help students move from holding each individual element of
the doctrine of assault as a separate chunk into one more-efficient chunk that
contains all of the elements of an assault.
Similarly, stories can help us to recall information. "Stimuli that help people
retrieve information from long-term memory are called retrieval cues."'5 -Further,
the ability of a stimulus to act successfully can depend upon the "degree to which
the [cue] taps into information that was encoded at the time of learning. 56
"Because long-term memories are often encoded semantically, cues related to the
meaning of the stored information tend to work best.517 For example, a story will
provide a semantic context for legal doctrine until that doctrine has a meaning of
its own. Thus, thinking about the Bernie Madoff story may trigger the contract
doctrine of unconscionability. Similarly, the fact that the memory is encoded
with the meaning of the legal doctrine as elicited through the story demonstrates
that the principle is not abstract but has real-world consequences. It also makes
students' retrieval of the material covered in class more likely.5"
54. Graham & McJohn, supra note 24, at 261.
55. BERNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 43, at 249.
56. Id. at 250.
57. Id.
58. This scenario is overly simplistic since many other factors having to do with the actual story and the
way it was told may contribute to memory. For example, psychologists tell us that a memory may also be
context dependent (retrieval occurs best when it occurs in the same environment where the material was
learned) and state dependent (whether a person was sober and what mood they were in). Id. at 250-51.
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This chart, below, captures these relationships:
CHART 2: THE SENSE-MEANING RELATIONSHIP
59
-No Yes
]Yes M ~~l'
3. Context and Meaning: Experts and Novices
A further contribution, consistent with anthropology, is represented by the
story as a teaching device as it relates to memory retrieval. This arises from the
effects of schemas on memory. Schemas are defined as "mental representations
of categories of objects, events, and people." 60 In light of the anthropological
view of culture, stories could arguably be described as culturally shared schemas.
In this sense, sharing stories has at least two advantages. In an era where law
schools, thankfully, seek out students from diverse backgrounds and ethnic
groups, there may not be a shared canon of stock stories. 6' Using stories in the
classroom can provide that common vocabulary and experience-thus
contributing to developing richer schemas as legal information is added. Second,
stories can also provide a level of emotional safety and comfort that makes
learning possible.
Professor Hilary Burgess notes that one of the most important reasons to use
schemas is that they help students to both retain and transfer information to new
situations, perhaps the essence of legal training. 2 Drawing on insights from
cognitive psychology, much of which is explained above, she argues that one of
the most important things a professor can do in the classroom is to help law
students create schemas, that is, help them link new information to information
they already have so that it can be retained in long-term memory. 6' Building on
59. SOUSA, supra note 52, at 49.
60. BERNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 43, at 255.
61. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 32 (discussing the use of stock stories in litigation).
62. Burgess, supra note 30, at 8.
63. Id. at 30. "The easier the concept is to integrate into an existing framework or schema, the easier the
concept is to learn, understand and retain." Id. (citation omitted).
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this information, she suggests that introducing concepts repeatedly over a
"distributed period" and teaching it in multimodal ways (that is, through multiple
sensory avenues) is more likely to contribute to building better pathways in the
brain for information integration and retrieval, that is, learning.
64
Burgess uses a concept from John Bransford's research focusing on the ways
in which novices learn differently from experts.6 -Burgess points out that "experts
learn differently than novices," 6  because experts, who have established schemas,
can more easily distinguish between "critical and less relevant information. ",7
Students, for example, may analogize "the court system to a family tree," and one
of the responsibilities of a law professor is to help them create a good
organizational system for new knowledge.68
Bransford and his colleagues focus extensive attention on the difference
between novices and experts in the classroom.69 Basically, experts are expert
learners within their discipline because they "have acquired extensive knowledge
that affects what they notice and how they organize, represent, and interpret
information in their environment. This, in turn, affects their abilities to
remember, reason, and solve problems., 70 A student and a teacher will experience
the same stimulus differently because of their past experiences." In discussing an
example from physics, Bransford notes that the expert will start with major
applicable principles and rationales combined with methodologies for applying
these to a problem]. In contrast, a student will probably approach the same
problem by trying to recall and manipulate a memorized formula that they
believe pertinent to the problem without seeing an underlying principle for
64. Id. at 27.
65. Burgess' discussion of this work permeates her article. Id. passim. Basically, she argues that current
law-school pedagogy results in "cognitive overload" because students do not have a way to organize the mass
of information, via efficient chunking, into working memory and thereafter semantic memory. Id. at 27-28.
"When students are first introduced to a discipline, they have not yet organized the associated information into
'chunks."' Id. at 28. Merritt adds that "[1]aw school instruction probably exceeds the capacity of students'
working memory quite often. The problem is compounded by the fact that professors, who have already
combined these elements into larger schema, can accommodate more material in working memory than students
can." Merritt, supra note 26, at 48.
66. Burgess, supra note 30, at 30; see also, Merritt, supra note 26, at 46 (arguing that it is crucial to
relate new information that is already in long-term memory).
67. Id. at 30.
68. Id. at 30-33 (noting that the sooner this is done, the more rapidly a class can advance to more
advanced topics).
69. Bransford, supra note 39, at 17, 29-72. While their research focuses on the K-12 classroom, they
note that "the principles apply to adult learning as well." Id. at 26.
70. Id. at 31.
71. Id. at 32. In this sense, learning the law resembles the language acquisition of young children. A
young child may call all waterborne birds ducks. See Greene, supra note 30, at 27. But, as they become older,
having more experiences and making more connections, their ability to generalize and discriminate ("the yin
and yang of learning and memory") become more developed. Id. Thus, the older child will identify ducks,
geese, and swans. Id.
72. Bransford, supra note 39, at 37.
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selecting a particular formula. 3 Moreover, experts are much more adept and fluid
at retrieving information, as well as applying information to a new problem with
understanding rather than as a result of rote memorization. 4 Further, they point
out importantly that "transfer," or what I will call learning, is affected to the
degree to which people learn with understanding rather than mere
memorization."
Similarly, Professors Graham and McJohn, using the language of "metaphor"
rather than of schema, point out that the value of metaphor, especially as found in
stories, is a key feature of improving learning in legal education: "Lawyers deal
with stories, not just legal rules or analogies., 76 Much of their article discusses
the role that context, defined by them as metaphor, controls human thinking. "To
change someone's view, reasoned argument will never be sufficient. Rather,
supplanting the metaphor that controls their thinking on the subject is required., 77
These metaphors help us to organize knowledge and reach both rational and
emotional aspects of knowing." From a depiction of metaphor, they move to
story as a unit of thinking: "Most of our experience, our knowledge, and our
thinking are organized as stories."79 The remainder of their article focuses on the
ways in which stories broaden our legal reasoning, s° as well as provide a
framework for learning and understanding because they can constitute a chunk8
and have emotional content that makes it "easier to learn and remember. ,82
To expand my thesis further I would argue that the use of stories in the law-
school classroom is valuable in helping the student-novice become a legal expert.
As students make a transition from undergraduate studies and non-legal life,
stories can act as a transition, context, and metaphor for assimilating a broad
range of legal material. The stories can become a stage upon which cases are
enacted with deeper meaning and context. Rather than learn didactically about
unconscionability, the student who has read stories about the financial crisis as
well has a framework that ties everyday knowledge to specialized legal
73. Id. They tie the development of a schema or context to more efficient chunking: "In each case,
expertise in a domain helps people develop a sensitivity to patterns of meaningful information that are not
available to novices." Id. at 33.
74. Id. at 43-44, 55-68. Textbooks are not the best way to teach people when to use knowledge or how
to transfer it. Id. at 43.
75. Id. at 55.
76. Graham & McJohn, supra note 25, at 258.
77. Id. at 271.
78. Id. This foreshadows the work of evolutionary psychologists who increasingly argue that thinking
involves both rationality and emotion. See, e.g., Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Evolutionary Psychology and
the Emotions, in MICHAEL LEWIS, HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS (Michael Lewis & Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones
eds., 2d ed. 2000); PINKER, How THE MIND WORKS, supra note 3, at 370. Although not an evolutionary
psychologist, this is also borne out in the work of ANTONIO DAMASIO, supra note 18.
79. Graham & McJohn, supra note 25, at 280.
80. Id. at 281.
81. Id. at 283-84.
82. Id. at 283.
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knowledge. Of course, this calls upon the instructor to select narrative materials
carefully in a way that reinforces the structure of doctrine. In class discussions, a
particular story may become emblematic for recall of a difficult doctrine and its
context. Hopefully, the students move past memorizing rules into understanding
their application.
Finally, research on memory reinforces the importance of context if one
defines context as the web of connections between pieces of information held in
the memory. "The discovery that memory is all about connections has
revolutionary implications for education. It means that memory is integral to
thought and that nothing we learn can stand in isolation; we sustain new learning
only to the degree we can relate it to what we already know." 3
These insights pertain to practice as well. In our roles as counselor or
advocate, we are frequently required to explain a particular legal doctrine to
clients or members of the lay public. Many of us have probably heard people
complain about the prolixity and complexity of legal explanations. On the other
hand, a client meeting in which some information is delivered as a narrative, for
example, "Here's a story about a company that did this the wrong way," will
focus client attention and enhance their comprehension and retention of the
content of our communication. It also explains why more comprehensible
government regulations are frequently accompanied by examples-little stories
that explain how a particular regulation works on the ground.
B. Cultural Anthropology
Around 30,000 years ago, a time that many think tracks the rise of
civilization, something amazing happened. There were more grandparents.
83. Greene, supra note 30, at 24. This is supported by a laboratory study that shows memory does not
exist in one location, but rather is "distributed across the entire cerebral cortex." Id. His article also provides a
concise explanation of the history of memory research and our current theories of memory. Id. at 22-29.
84. Piece of Evolution Puzzle Added; Grandparents Helped Spur Rise of Civilization, REDORBIT (July
21, 2004), http://www.redorbit.com/news/science/73364/piece-of-evolution-puzzle-added-_grandparents-
helped-spur_rise/index.html [hereinafter REDORBIT] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). There is no way
to pinpoint with certainty, at this time, exactly when homo sapiens became modem man. For example, Professor
Hrdy, who is the major researcher behind alloparent theory, notes that we have "evolved only within the last
200,000 years." Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, Meet the Alloparents, NAT. HIST. MAG., http://www.naturalhistorymag.
comlfeatures/09270/meet-the-alloparents (last visited May 8, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(adapted from SARAH BLAFFER HRDY, MOTHERS AND OTHERS: THE EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF MUTUAL
UNDERSTANDING (2009)). Moreover, "behaviorally modem humans, capable of symbolic thought and
language, emerged more recently still, within the last 80,000 years." Id. (emphasis in original).
85. REDORBIT, supra note 84; see also Betty A. Sichel, Beyond Moral Stories, PHIL. EDUC. SOC'Y,
http://ojs.ed.uiuc.edu/index.php/pes/article/view/2235/930 (1996) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(providing a modem version of this phenomena). Sichel begins her article: "Tell me a story, Grandma." Id. at 1.
She then describes much of alloparent storytelling as the transmission of moral education (which I see very
closely akin to law) in which, citing Martha Nussbaum's book, Love's Knowledge (1990) and the work of child
psychiatrist Robert Coles, depict literature as a form of "moral stories for moral education" that help us become
a moral person and expand our awareness and sensitivity to others. Id. at 3, 5-7. These themes are shared in
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While it appears that humans have always told stories, it did not do young people
much good if no one was available to tell them stories because the storytellers
were out hunting or gathering. The survival of grandparents changed this
dynamic. Anthropologists have pointed out that increased rates of survivorship
among adults provided a cadre of people who could "watch[] and educate[] the
young. 86 While increasing survivorship made wider territorial spread possible, it
also meant that a particular group's collective wisdom could be transmitted to the
young rather than having each individual learn on the basis of private and limited
experience. This lays a foundation for not just the spread of civilization, but its
ability to innovate on a collectively shared knowledge base. As Lawrence Rosen
noted: "Human beings possess the capacity to create the categories of their own
experience, and this capability, having largely replaced instinct, came before-
and was instrumental in creating-the animal we have become.""
In this account, stories are successful in teaching because they are cultural
artifacts that allow us to transmit wisdom as well as to survive and flourish. More
fundamentally, this shared rearing, in Hrdy's estimation, led to the growth of
empathy and "endowed [us] with a rudimentary theory of mind," laying the
groundwork for cooperation among early humans.8 One could speculate about
the ways in which both a theory of mind and growing cooperation (and the need
to maintain it) may have led to the development of early laws and social norms.
In the same way, law, like stories, creates another key domain of culture with
which storytelling profoundly overlaps in its use of metaphor and fact creating. 9
For example, Rosen argues that one should see "law as constituted by culture,
and culture (in no small way) by law, . . . [and that it] is indeed an excellent
storehouse of stories.' 9" His study of law aims to show that an anthropological
study of law reveals a great deal about human social ordering, and that "[1]ike art
and literature, through law we attempt to order our ties to one another." 9' As a
common by philosophers, anthropologists, cognitive psychologists, and evolutionary psychologists.
86. REDORBIT, supra note 84; see also Hrdy, supra note 84. Hrdy also believes that this cooperative
breeding strategy "came before big brains." Id. In fact, it may have made them possible because it meant that
we were better nourished.
87. LAWRENCE ROSEN, LAW AS CULTURE: AN INVITATION 3 (2006).
88. Hrdy, supra note 84. This social learning is important because it meant that children and infants
would learn to read people and how to attract their attention. Id. The point here is that in this theory, empathy is
believed to be a cultural acquisition rather than an adaptation to group living as an evolutionary psychologist
might argue. This nature versus nurture, in terms of explanations for human behavior, is why I separate
anthropology from psychology.
89. ROSEN, supra note 87, at 9.
90. Id. at xii. This point of view is not necessarily at odds with the longer, and less familiar, description
of evolutionary psychology presented below. Every evolutionary psychologist described makes room for culture
and does not necessarily see it as adverse to natural selection. To date, however, evolutionary psychologists
have not focused on law in any serious fashion. Accord, Linda L. Berger, The Lady, or the Tiger?: A Field
Guide to Metaphor and Narrative, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 275, 278, 281 (2011) (noting "stories are entangled in
culture").
91. ROSEN, supra note 87, at 199.
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cultural category, law is also a key form of reasoning. "Whether a legal system
explicitly relies on metaphors or implicitly works through analogies to
recognized legal categories, metaphors serve as a vital bridge connecting the
style of legal reasoning to a society's overall style of cultural reasoning."'2 The
difference, though, between an account derived from cultural anthropology and
the one arising from evolutionary psychology will not be a difference so much in
the observation of the behavior, but its sources. The anthropologist, then, will tell
us we use stories because it is something we have done culturally from the
beginnings of our social history.93
Finally, evolutionary theory (below) and cultural theories do not necessarily
oppose each other. As we learn more about human history and brain science, it
may well be that they are complementary and related phenomena. For example,
Jones and Goldsmith suggest that although there are variations between legal
systems, they all care about roughly the same topics, including sex, inheritance,
family, property, and that they all express a number of social and normative
attitudes toward these topics. As cultural studies have demonstrated the overlaps
in topics and attitudes, some evolutionary theorists have concluded that "[i]t is
vanishingly unlikely that cultures across time and throughout the globe settled
upon these same basic features of law because they happened to encounter one
another. These features are almost undoubtedly an outgrowth of the effects of
evolutionary processes on human brains functioning in social environments."94
92. Id. at 133. Rosen requires the concept of "metaphor" to pull together much of his argument about
law and culture. To that extent, it fits well with insights about law and literature. As he states:
Metaphors are the glue of social and cultural life: They knit together the different domains in which
our concepts and our relationships exist with such force that they seem to be features of the natural
world.... Indeed, metaphors may be our species' vehicle for keeping open the possibilities of
moving from one way of conceiving reality to another, of adapting to changing circumstances by
keeping alive the very mechanism through which cultural alteration is effected.
Id. at 132; see also Linda H. Edwards, Once Upon a Time in Law: Myth, Metaphor, and Authority, 77 TENN. L.
REV. 883 (2010).
93. Rosen addresses some of the arguments regarding evolution and the possibility of evolved behavior
in his book. ROSEN, supra note 87, at 54-60. As he does with many phenomena, he sees "evolution" as a
metaphor and notes that "no one has persuasively specified the precise mechanisms through which social
evolution is purposed to operate." Id. at 56-57. In this, he relies on Stephen Jay Gould. Id. at 57.
94. Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 25, at 468.
Considering Topics and Content in light of evolutionary biology leads to the prediction that the
normative content of legal systems will tend, over the entire globe, to reflect evolved, species-typical
brains, even as the details of those legal systems will inevitably vary in many particulars. Legal
systems will not be identical, because there is ample room for cultural differences and historical
accident.... The evolved characteristics of the brain place some constraints on the range of
outcomes of legal systems and define the universe of cultural differences from which those legal
systems emerge.
Id. at 469. By way of example, they point to the fact that nearly all cultures distinguish between crimes of
passion and premeditated crimes. Id. at 470.
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C. Evolutionary Psychology
In the distant future I see open fields for far more important researches.
Psychology will be based on a new foundation, that of the necessary
acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation. Light will
be thrown on the origin of man and his history.
-Charles Darwin, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES9
With the publication of the late Denis Dutton's The Art Instinct,96 arguing
that humans, by nature of their evolution, are drawn to and adapted for the arts,
particularly music and narrative, the art and scientific worlds have been abuzz
with debate-nature or nurture? Culture or instinct? Dutton's compelling
presentation draws heavily on the works of John Tooby and Leda Cosmides,
scientists at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and the more well-
known works of Steven Pinker of Harvard.97 Not long after the publication of
Dutton's work, Brian Boyd published The Origin of Stories.9 These works ask us
to consider our assumptions about narrative and learning, suggesting that rather
than a product of culture, storytelling is an adaptation that is part of the human
psyche as a result of natural selection.99
95. COSTA, supra note 25, at 488 (quoting CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1859)).
96. DUTTON, supra note 1; see also Abrantes, supra note 20, at 3. "Humans have what we might call a
narrative instinct." Id. (emphasis in original).
97. In addition to How the Mind Works (1997), Pinker authored four other popular books: The Language
Instinct (1994), Words and Rules: The Ingredients of Language (1999), The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of
Human Nature (2002), and The Stuff of Thought: Language as a Window into Human Nature (2007). These are
in addition to his prolific scholarly writings. As it pertains to this article, see Steven Pinker, Toward a
Consilient Study of Literature, 31 PHIL. & LITERATURE 162 (2007).
98. BOYD, ON THE ORIGIN OF STORIES, supra note 1.
99. This theory is controversial, and most notably the late Stephen Jay Gould disagreed with this theory.
Id. at 36; see also Jeremy McCarter, Rage Against the Art Gene, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 6, 2009, at 49. My point in
describing this theory is neither to whole-heartedly endorse it nor to engage in an elaborate critique. That is
beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, it sheds a great deal of light onto our understanding of the human
mind. Many scientists dismiss accounts of human behavioral adaptations as "just so" stories. Although I do not
believe that Professor Medina endorses evolutionary psychology, he does note: "The brain is biological tissue; it
follows the rules of biology. And there's no bigger rule in biology than evolution through natural
selection .... " MEDINA, supra note 12, at 34. Although he agrees with evolutionary psychology that are brain
evolved for life on the savannah, he states that beyond this, there is a lack of evidence for precise adaptations.
Id.
Additionally, I am not arguing that accepting a role for evolution means that our behavior is determined.
"The essential point is that biological processes, properly understood, provide no support for genetically
deterministic views of human behavior, whether they arise from political motivations or from misconceptions."
Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 25, at 428; see also id. at 485-88 (discussing genetic determinism). Not
surprisingly, they also adhere to the "is/ought" distinction. Id. at 484-85.
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1. A Primer in Evolutionary Theory
One of the most formative events in the life sciences was the publication of
Darwin's The Origin of Species in 1859. It is only recently, however, that its
impact has been felt in the discipline of psychology.'0° Regardless of its
disciplinary setting, however, evolutionary theory remains constant in its basics:
randomness and natural selection. Evolution is the result of two contradictory
phenomena: randomness and natural selection. "Randomness" describes the
reality of genetic change through mutations, and acting on only this principle, life
on earth would not have advanced in any discernible direction. "Natural
selection," on the other hand, is the tendency of speciated populations to select
for those genetic mutations that confer survival of the gene. "Evolutionary
change is then the mechanical consequence of variation in heritable differences
between individuals whenever those differences are accompanied by differences
in survival and reproduction."1°' Evolutionary psychologists argue that "all
features of a species' cognitive or neural architecture are either adaptations,
byproducts, or genetic noise.' ' 2 Adaptations are well known to students of
biology as those changes that are present in an organism, including humans,
because they perform a function that contributed to genetic propagation.
Byproducts, on the other hand, have no adaptive function but operate because of
the presence of a useful adaptation. For example, it appears that we are adapted
100. John Tooby, The Emergence of Evolutionary Psychology, in EMERGING SYNTHESES IN SCIENCE:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOUNDING WORKSHOPS OF THE SANTA FE INSTITUTE 106, 106-07 (David Pines ed.,
1985).
101. Richard C. Lewontin, Not So Natural Selection, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (May 27, 2010),
available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/201Omay/27/not-so-natural-selectionl (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (reviewing JERRY FODOR & MASSIMO PIATITELLI-PALMARINI, WHAT DARWIN GOT
WRONG (2010)). Leading up to this observation, he summarizes the modem theory of evolution by natural
selection in four principles:
(1) The principle of variation: among individuals in a population there is variation in form,
physiology, and behavior.
(2) The principle of heredity: offspring resemble their parents more than they resemble unrelated
individuals.
(3) The principle of differential reproduction: in a given environment, some forms are more likely to
survive and produce more offspring than other forms.
[And, to explain long-term evolution]
(4) The principle of mutation: new heritable variation is constantly occurring.
Id.
He notes that most evolutionary biologists believe that the study of particular populations can reveal the
story of how selection operated in their particular case. Id. These changes are carried forward in our genes, and
he cautions that "it is not traits that are selected but organisms" which may present an implicit criticism of
evolutionary psychology, which at times seems to concentrate more on traits than on the human organism as a
whole. Id.; see also Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 25, at 426-31 (explaining the "foundational concepts" of
evolution).
102. John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, Does Beauty Build Adapted Minds? Toward an Evolutionary
Theory of Aesthetics, Fiction and the Arts, 94/95 SUBSTANCE 6, 6 (2001) [hereinafter Tooby & Cosmides, Does
Beauty Build Adapted Minds?].
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to' avoid or fear venomous snakes, but our fear of non-venomous snakes would be
a byproduct of the adaptation. 3 Noise is just that: expressions of the random
arrangement and functioning of various genes.10
2. Evolutionary Psychology-What Is It?
Evolutionary Psychology (EP) is susceptible to both positive and negative
explanations. For example, EP's adherents are quite vocal about what it is not.
Pinker argues that EP is not sociobiology, a school of psychology popularized in
the 1970s and 1980s: "[T]here is no need to strain for adaptive explanations for
everything we do. Our ancestral environment lacked the institutions that now
entice us to nonadaptive choices ... ."'05 On an even more strident note, Tooby
and Cosmides reject what they call the standard social science model (SSSM),
which privileges humans above other organisms by claiming that culture exempts
us from the operation of evolution.' °6 From this vantage point, EP is vehemently
opposed to cultural anthropology's assumption that culture alone explains all
human development.
From a positive point of view, EP attempts to bring together advances in a
number of fields such as field anthropology, genetics, neurobiology, and
evolutionary biology, and to weave together a coordinated, elegant account of
adaptative human behavior and brain development. It is focused on trying to
explain "why we have the kind of mind we have."'' 7
The EP scientists' methodology is typically referred to as a type of "reverse
engineering.' ' 8 These scientists begin with the assumption that "[t]he mind is a
system of organs of computation, designed by natural selection to solve the kinds
of problems our ancestors faced... "'9A concomitant assumption, borne out by
103. Significantly, PINKER, supra note 3, at 524 & Ch. 8, generally argues that our attraction and use of
literature and the arts are byproducts of an adaptation while DUTTON, supra note 1, passim, BOYD, ON THE
ORIGIN OF STORIES, supra note 1, passim, and Tooby & Cosmides, supra note 102, argue that our attraction to
beauty is an adaptation. In this, all four authors point especially to narrative and music.
104. PINKER, supra note 3, at 174; see also John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, Conceptual Foundations of
Evolutionary Psychology, in D.M. Buss, THE HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 5, 25 (2005).
Gould called much of what an evolutionary psychologist would call an adaptation a "spandrel." This is an
architectural feature, the space between two arches, that appears to be integral to design. Instead, it is a
byproduct of the design rather than a direct result of the design. McCarter, supra note 99, at 51.
105. PINKER, supra note 3, at 42.
106. Tooby & Cosmides, Conceptual Foundations of Evolutionary Psychology, supra note 104, at 6-7.
107. PINKER, supra note 3, at 23 (emphasis in original).
108. Id. at 21-23; see also, e.g., Bradley Duchaine et al., Evolutionary Psychology and the Brain, II
CURRENT OPINION IN NEUROBIOLOGY 225-30 (2001); Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Evolutionary
Psychology: Theoretical Foundations, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE 54, 55 (2005).
109. PINKER, supra note 3, at 21. Pinker notes, however, that one should not fall prey to the metaphor
that the mind is the equivalent of a computer; it is not. He is adamant that a computational theory of mind is not
the equivalent of mind as computer. Id. at 26-27. Most salient is the fact that a computer is a serial processor
while the mind is a parallel processor. Id. at 26.
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neuroscience, " ° is that the brain is a system of organs or modules "defined by the
special things they do with the information available to them""' for which the
"basic logic is specified by our genetic program."" 2 Similarly, neuroscientists
assume that the mind is a compilation of content-specific systems rather than
content-general; each module solves a specific problem rather than having
general intelligence that could solve any problem a human confronted." 3 Using
the same principles of observation that inform evolutionary biology, the
evolutionary psychologist looks at a behavior or function to determine what
kinds of problems the particular module was designed, by natural selection, to
solve. 14
Given this content-specific structure, the scientists believe that the mind is
not a blank slate nor is it any longer accurate to characterize humans as having a
mind/body problem. We come with "sub-routines," if you will, hard-wired into
us by natural selection. While these content specific routines work with culture," 5
they nonetheless limit our interactions with and ability to create culture.
Similarly, if the brain is a physical system, a collection of organs that is part of
our body, and it constitutes the mind, then there is really little reason to
distinguish between the mind and the body.
110. Much of what we know about brain structure and function is as a result of modern imagining
technology. For an accessible review of these technologies, see Owen D. Jones et al., Brain Imaging for Legal
Thinkers: A Guide for the Perplexed, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5 (2009).
111. PINKER, supra note 3, at 31; see also id. at 27-31.
112. Id.at2l.
113. Duchaine et al., supra note 108, at 226.
114. Id. at 225; see also, e.g., Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Evolutionary Psychology: A Primer,
http://www.psych.ucsb.edu/research/cep/primer.html (last updated Jan. 13, 1997) (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review). Professors Cosmides and Tooby maintain this website as a resource for members of the public or
other scientists interested in evolutionary psychology.
115. Again, evolutionary psychologists distinguish themselves from sociobiologists in that they agree
that culture is an operative factor in human behavior. Our innate structure of mind enables us to "create,
transmit, and assimilate cultural phenomena." Tooby, supra note 100, at 112. For them, culture is not "some
kind of invisible hand" that explains all facets of human behavior. John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, Evolutionary
Psychology and the Generation of Culture, Part I. Theoretical Considerations, 10 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY
29, 30 (1989). Rather, our innate psychological structures created a phenomenon, culture, that now acts more
quickly upon us than biological evolution. Id. at 35. The point, then, is that both natural selection and culture
exert an influence on human behavior; they are not opposed nor are they sole operators. Id. passim. As such,
Pinker notes that this is not sociobiology: "To say that the mind is an evolutionary adaptation is not to say that
all behavior is adaptive in Darwin's sense.... [Niatural selection is not a puppetmaster [sic] that pulls the
strings of behavior directly.... Behavior itself did not evolve; what evolved was the mind." PINKER, supra note
3, at 41-42. Pinker is also much more up front about the way in which this theory challenges conventional
wisdom and "psychological correctness." Id. at 44-58. He also faces the question of free will and morality,
concluding, that they are separate domains. Id. at 53-57. Finally, he notes, "[elvolution and learning can also go
on simultaneously, with innate structure evolving in an animal that also learns." Id. at 177. Ultimately, having a
lot of built-in "machinery" only makes us "more intelligent[] and flexibl[e]" so that "every part of human
intelligence involves culture and learning .... It is made possible by innate machinery designed to do the
learning." Id. at 33 (emphasis in original).
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One of the most salient contributions these scientists have made as it pertains
to my argument is that emotions are the result of natural selection. Above, I
explained the significance of emotionally competent stimuli to gain students'
attention in the classroom. Emotions turn out to be the fulcrum for not only
understanding why this may be true in instructional settings, but act as the
connective theory to explain the attraction, in part, of narrative. As Pinker notes,
not only are we thinking machines, we are "feeling machines."" 6 Emotions, in
this view, are indispensable adaptations that work together with our intellect. The
remaining question, given reverse engineering, is "Why do we have emotions?"
The answer is that emotions are an adaptation that allow us to choose among
competing avenues of action, because "[ain animal cannot pursue all its goals at
once."" 7 Thus, thinking and feeling are fluid and interdependent, and we have,
over time developed a repertoire of feelings that helped us survive life on the
savannah, for example, fear of snakes, disgust for certain foods, and in our
emerging social groups, for example, empathy, altruism, et cetera."8
Finally, Pinker addresses the arts, generally finding that they are not so much
an adaptation (although he makes an exception for narrative) as they are a by-
product of other adaptations. They are, like a fondness for cheesecake or
pornography, activities that exist because of our innate interest in pleasure.
"[M]usic is auditory cheesecake, an exquisite confection crafted to tickle the
sensitive spots of at least six of our mental faculties."" 9 He is willing, however, to
make stronger claims for literature because of its role in human social life.
120
First, literature often partakes of gossip, a universal human pastime, because it
confers knowledge and "knowledge is power."'' Second, it also instructs, and
here he compares novels to scientific experiments, pondering whether robots
would invent literature.' 22 As such, literature acts as a laboratory for trying out
various human hypotheses about how others might behave in a given situation.
He concludes, aptly for this paper, by observing: "The clich6 that life imitates art
is true because the function of some kinds of art is for life to imitate it.
' 2
1
116. PINKER, supra note 3, at 363-424 (Chapter 6: Hotheads).
117. Id. at 373.
118. Id. at 374-404. The discovery of the "mirror neuron" also supports this theory. This neuron is what
causes us, in part, to mimic others. See, e.g., Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Evolutionary Psychology and the
Emotions, in MICHAEL LEWIS, HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS, supra note 78 (Emotions are an adaptation that allow
us to perform a type of executive function when choosing among competing goals and motivations. Similarly,
they allow us to assimilate environmental clues about our conspecifics that led to a theory of mind.).
119. PINKER, supra note 3, at 534.
120. Id. at538-41.
121. Id. at 540.
122. Id. at 541.
123. Id. at 543.
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3. Is There an Art Instinct? Does Fiction Build Adapted Minds?
Human beings across the globe expend staggering amounts of time and
resources on creating and experiencing fantasies and fictions. The
human fascination with fiction is so intense that it can amount to a
virtual addiction. 
124
Denis Dutton in The Art Instinct makes the most accessible argument for the
proposition that humans possess an "art instinct."' 25 Beginning his argument by
noting that there is a cross-cultural experience of art along twelve dimensions, he
notes that the imaginative experience may be the most important component of
art.1 6 He then takes up the inquiry posed by Tooby and Cosmides: "Evolutionary
researchers want to know why the mind is designed to find stories interesting.' 27
Wary of Pinker's argument that our love of fiction is a byproduct, Dutton begins
a careful proof of why our "addiction" would be an adaptation rather than an
evolutionary byproduct. 8 Basically, he puts forward three plausible reasons: (1)
fiction provides "low-cost, low-risk surrogateexperience"; (2) stories provide a
"vivid and memorable way of communicating information"; and (3) stories, by
allowing exploration of others, develop "adaptive interpersonal and social
capacities .... Stories provide regulation for social behavior." 2 9 Stories, story-
making, and storytelling are remarkably biologically efficient ways to build a
store of experience in the human animal. The variability for which humans are
adapted in terms of terrain and situations cannot be handled by "mere" instinct,
as we typically think of instincts as fixed behaviors to environmental stimuli.
Stories allow us to experiment without threat to life and limb across a wide swath
of human intellectual, narrative capital: "vivid gossip, mythologies, technical
know-how, and moral fables."''
As Dutton describes it, storytelling does not seem appreciably different from
what Langdell hoped to accomplish through the Socratic method: "[T]he ability
to think counterfactually, case-based reasoning adds a capacity to interpret and so
gain knowledge by drawing analogies and identifying dissimilarities in richly
complex situations that are confronted in reality and contemplated in
124. DUrON, supra note 1.
125. Id.
126. See id.
127. Tooby & Cosmides, Does Beauty Build Adapted Minds?, supra note 102, at 8.
128. DUTrON, supra note 1, at 109-12.
129. Id. at 110. This last argument is particularly interesting for lawyers, and as I will argue in the
conclusion, perhaps provides a bridge between law, cultural anthropology, and evolutionary psychology. See
V.S. RAMACHANDRAN, THE TELL-TALE BRAIN: A NEUROSCIENTIST'S QUEST FOR WHAT MAKES US HUMAN
(2011) (providing the most recent entry in the "art as instinct" debate).
130. PINKER, supra note 3, at 538-43; BOYD, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES, supra note 1, passim;
VERMEULE, supra note 3, passim.
131. DUTTON,supra note 1, at 113.
1025
2012 /Feeling at Home. Law, Cognitive Science, and Narrative
imagination."' 32 The fact that we have an adaptive mechanism to deal with widely
varying circumstances means that as we "outgrew automatic animal instincts,"
the use of stories to template behavior meant that if we absorbed the lessons of
stories, we could escape the "confusion and uncertainty in choices available for
action."'33 In this sense, law and narrative are wedded by providing social
ordering for our species, although law is arguably cultural while narrative is
adaptative.
But our distanced emotional experience of art and imagination was also an
important adaptation. In their articles on emotion and evolution, Tooby and
Cosmides inquire about our ability to fail to act on products of our imagination.'
34
That we can do so, in some sense is amazing, since modem fMRI technology has
taught us that with mirror neurons and other behaviors, we can literally activate
the part of our brain associated with an action "light up" without undertaking the
action.'35 In fact, the ability to separate imagination, emotion, and action are
crucial to our survival because if we acted on the roar of every imagined
predator, we would be, quite frankly, nervous wrecks! In technical terms, Tooby
and Cosmides call this "decoupled cognition" or the ability to "play" at real
activities or, as adults, to while away hours in literary decoupled cognition
reading novels or watching movies.'36
Published shortly after Dutton's work, Brian Boyd has tackled the question
of narrative directly in his book, On the Origin of Stories: Evolution, Cognition,
and Fiction.3 7 Building on the work of Tooby and Cosmides, Pinker, Dutton, and
Ellen Dissanayake,13 Boyd takes a slightly different approach to explain why
affection for narrative or stories is adaptive behavior. 39 First, he builds on
Dutton's idea that part of our attraction to art is that we enjoy playing.' ° After a
132. Id. at 114.
133. Id. at 120.
134. Tooby & Cosmides, Does Beauty Build Adapted Minds?, supra note 102.
135. PINKER, supra note 3, at 289.
136. Tooby & Cosmides, Does Beauty Build Adapted Minds?, supra note 102.
137. BOYD, ON THE ORIGIN OF STORIES, supra note 1.
138. ELLEN DISSANAYAKE, WHAT IS ART FOR? (1988). Dissanayake was one of the first to argue that
there is a biobehaviorial need for art, and attempted to bridge the chasm between biology and art.
139. Boyd's theory is not the only one available. See, e.g., PETER SWIRSKI, OF LITERATURE AND
KNOWLEDGE: EXPLORATIONS IN NARRATIVE THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS, EVOLUTION, AND GAME THEORY
(2007). Swirski believes that the behavior of narrative was adaptive because it allows us to engage in thought
experiments, particularly those that involve game theory as story in trying to estimate how other people will act
in given situations. See id. The fact that there are at least three prevailing explanations for a taste for narrative
being an adaptation is concerning because it suggests, at the very least, that more research needs to be done so
that either these theories can be unified, discredited (in the sense that a taste for narrative is an evolutionary
byproduct), or the one of the accounts can be validated as true.
140. Melvin Konner recently documented confirmation for the role of play as a possible adaptation in
human behavior. MELVIN KONNER, THE EVOLUTION OF CHILDHOOD: RELATIONSHIPS, EMOTION, MIND (2010).
Konner confirms that the development of cooperative breeding, or alloparenting, was important in human
development. Id. at 426-51.
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very careful discussion of nature versus culture, natural selection, and the
evolution of intelligence, he focuses on the evolution of cooperation.14' He notes:
"You and I need not only to share norms but also to know we share them, so that
we feel the pressure not only to resist the temptation to cheat but also to resist the
temptation not to slacken in dealing with others who cheat." 4  Storytelling is a
way to communicate these norms to others, but most importantly it is a way to
"enlist cooperation." "Stories arose ... out of our intense interest in social
monitoring. They succeed by riveting our attention to social information, whether
in the form of gossip ... or fiction."
A second compelling reason for the ascendency of narrative is play. Here,
Boyd confronts Pinker's argument that a taste for the arts is a by-product of
evolution, rather than an adaptation. '44 Boyd concludes that given the costliness
of art and play in terms of survival, it would have been "weeded out" if it did not
serve an adaptive purpose. 45 It allows us to play with pattern-patterns of human
behavior or visual forms in our environment. Because of this, art commands our
attention in a way that was instrumental to the development of cooperation and
sociality. 46 Finally, Boyd focuses on fiction because it helps us to understand and
recall events, and is instrumental in the development of our theory of mind-the
way that we understand other people.17 He identifies several functions for fiction
and narrative that contribute to our survival. Narrative allows us to recall and
understand events,'4 and understand other people through the development of
social intelligence and a theory of mind. 49 Furthermore, it represents events in a
way that allows us to test beliefs and manipulate reality so that "narrative may
help us to make better decisions" by freeing us from information that came solely
from our own perspectives. 5
141. BOYD, ON THE ORIGIN OF STORIES, supra note 1, at 51-66 (Ch. 4: The Evolution of Cooperation).
142. Id. at 63 (emphasis in original). At this point, the overlap with Swirski is most apparent. See
SWIRSKI, supra note 139. Boyd also hypothesizes, in passing, that this same need led larger social groups to
"[c]entralized systems of justice." BOYD, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES, supra note I, at 64.
143. BOYD, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES, supra note l, at 64. Another agent that ensured compliance
with social norms, he notes, was religion. Id. Boyd does not distinguish between "true" accounts and fiction in
ascribing this value to narrative. It is largely for this reason that I have chosen not to distinguish between fiction
and journalism (not true and true accounts). Moreover, all of this behavior is preliterate, that is, our interest in
story came before our ability to write.
144. See id. at 80-96.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 101.
147. Id. at 129-206.
148. Id. at 132-40. For example, he notes that "[c]omparison clarifies judgments." Id. at 140.
149. Id. at 141-49.
150. Id. at 166.
As our brains expanded, we could apply the past to the present and futures still more flexibly. But
we were still trapped within what we had witnessed and remembered ourselves. With narrative we
could, for the first time, share experience with others who could then pass on to still others what they
had found most helpful for their own reasoning about future actions. We still have to act within our
1027
2012 / Feeling at Home: Law, Cognitive Science, and Narrative
Evolutionary psychology provides a compelling set of reasons for using
narrative-we are adapted to use narrative. Particularly in law, narrative is useful
because it attempts to secure compliance with social norms and involves social
relations. Moreover, its play allows us to forecast, and understand more deeply,
the behavior of others.
IV. CONCLUSION
At the end of the day, around the academic fire pit, one wonders whether our
ardent attention to stories as a result of culture or adaptation really matters. After
all, for whatever reason, we are hooked on stories. "We have known for some
time that stories are among the primary ways of making sense of the world,
including the world of law.""' There are a number of reasons founded in cultural
studies and cognitive science to use narrative in legal instruction:
• Stories command attention.
" Stories engage emotions in a way that is crucial to engagement of
thinking.
* Stories allow students to more quickly build a schema for integration
of legal materials so that they can move from a novice to an expert
status.
" We are adapted to benefit from narrative.
Indeed, in the course of writing this article, I found various academics
advocating that "narrative theory and storytelling can be used ... across [all]
types of courses and types of lawyering. ''152 Grose, for example, argues that
lawyers use stories against the backdrop of three particular variables: "the law,
the facts, and the client's goals," and that in practice, "[s]torytelling is
pervasive." '53 Because of this reality, she argues that pedagogy must incorporate
storytelling as a way to (1) teach doctrine and skills; (2) draw attention to values
underlying the law; and (3) help develop students' critical ability to question
legal doctrine.
54
own time, but with narrative we can be partially freed from the limits of the present and the self.
Id.
151. Edwards, supra note 21, at 886.
152. Grose, supra note 19, at 39. Her article explores the idea that narrative and storytelling can be used
to teach "critical thinking and reflection about [students'] role as lawyers." Id. at 41. This is based on the
premise that "law is made up of stories that are constructed by lawyers, clients, and decision makers." Id.
153. Id. at 44.
154. Id. at 47-48. She sees the use of narrative as important for meeting the goals set out in The
Carnegie Report, in WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION
OF LAW (2007), also in RoY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (2007).
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In the course of writing this article, for example, I found that I had to
reevaluate my opinion of hypotheticals. In light of these theories, hypotheticals
can be a type of narrative play'" that allow students to explore the law in what
Boyd would argue is an adaptively useful way to explore dimensions of doctrine
before encountering it in practice. Similarly, the cognitive psychologist would
tell you that it also allows students to build a context for doctrine more quickly.
In this sense, I would argue that hypotheticals are related to metaphor, or units of
narrative, that help us "to understand new and unfamiliar concepts.' s6
Stories matter because, as James Boyd White and Carrie Menkel-Meadow
tell us, those are the presenting symptoms when a client appears in our office. It
behooves legal educators to prepare students to intelligently and compassionately
hear these stories even while they simultaneously translate these stories into
vignettes of power to effectuate the client's goals. In this vision, there is no real
division between legal education and legal practice because the former should
prepare the student for the latter. If the one constant (besides power) that is
operating here is the story, then it behooves us to teach students how to most
effectively work with the story and work with those in practice to understand
how techniques dealing with stories may change over time.
But these insights transcend the classroom. Narrative is crucial in any area of
legal practice, whether one is in dispute resolution or transactions. At the
beginning of the client relationship, understanding the power of narrative
reinforces ethical duties to attend to a client's story and goals. When beginning to
translate the client's story into something that the legal system can manipulate (in
a positive sense), the importance of a sensitive rendering becomes paramount
because such a translation enhances the power of a client's position and the
likelihood of reaching client goals. Similarly, using stories with opposing parties,
judges, juries, and other audiences can both inform and persuade. Even for other
lawyers, as opposed to lay people involved in legal procedures, the use of a story
can provide context that enables everyone to get up to speed quickly and in a
meaningful manner.
In my most speculative moments, this research has led me to ponder the
origins and nearly universal global presence of legal systems. So to return to the
beginning.' It is a summer evening. The air is warm and soft. The story
begins ... One member of the tribe tells an elaborate and heart-felt story of a
wrong done to him by another member of the group. Property was misused
perhaps, and fishing nets were broken. Rather than seek relief in self-help, this
storyteller implicitly is asking the tribe to take his side in this tale of woe.
155. Along these lines, consider Bryan Adamson et al., Can the Professor Come Out and Play?-
Scholarship, Teaching, and Theories of Play, 58 J. LEGAL EDuc. 481 (2008).
156. Berger, supra note 90, at 279.
157. "Time present and time past / Are both perhaps present in time future, / And time future contained
in time past." T.S. ELIOT, Burnt Norton, in COLLECTED POEMS: 1909-1962, at 175, lines 1-3 (Harcourt, Brace
& World, Inc. 1958).
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Another member, likely older, recalls a similar story some years back. As tribe
members shift their attention from the aggrieved to this new storyteller, he recites
from memory his recollections of those events and what the tribe did in that
circumstance-requiring the wrongdoer to make new nets for the aggrieved.
Nodding in agreement, the tribe agrees and this story becomes precedent for
misuse of fishing nets, only later to be broadened out to apply to any personal
property. And thus, a legal system is born.'58
158. Linda H. Edwards suggests that "law has stories" and describes a series of major cases as
archetypes of particular types of stories. Edwards, supra note 21, at 883. As our storytelling has evolved, she
argues that "[u]nearthing the stories beneath the legal arguments in the Miranda and Hardwick briefs expands
our academic understanding of how law develops" noting that "rescue stories" call for affirmation of existing
law while "[b]irth stories" call for legal reform. Id. at 907-08. This argument would overlap with the more
scientific approach that law mirrors universal conflicts and issues that appear in all cultures (that is, allocation
of private resources, exchanges, sex, et cetera). Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 25, at 474 tbl. 1.
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